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THERE has smouldered for many years a question whether the 
Negotiable Instruments Law should apply to long term commer- 
cial paper-the bonds, debentures, equipment trust certificates 
and other instruments invented by an ingenious financial com- 
munity. Not that any one doubts that such paper should be nego- 
tiable, for there has been no criticism of the decisions so holding, 
nor has there been much concern whether negotiability was 
reached under the Act or by common law recognition of custom. 
But when, as has happened several times in recent years, an in- 
strument of this class has run afoul the statute and been held 
non-negotiable, a considerable flare-up has resulted.1 Heated 
statements have been made decrying the "stereotyping," 
"strait-jacketing" effect of the Act; it is said that the courts 
must be given room within which newly devised instruments 
may be recognized, and that bonds, being long term paper, are 
functionally different from notes, bills and checks-in fact, are 
traded in by different people.2 From this it has been somewhat 
hastily concluded that the Act should have no application to such 
paper. This, it is fair to say, has become the general opinion 
among writers on the subject.3 
* Professor of Law, Yale University, author of Changing Objectives in 
Legal Education (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 576. 
f Editor of the YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1930-31; now practicing in New 
York City. 
1 One of the first cases to provoke general discussion, although not de- 
cided under the N. I. L., was Crocker National Bank v. Byrne & McDonnell, 
178 Cal. 329, 173 Pac. 752 (1918). Bonds which recited that they were 
secured by a trust deed or mortgage were held non-negotiable. See ad- 
verse criticism in Comment (1918) 6 CAL. L. REV. 444. 
2 See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1926) 7, for a 
summary of the argument. 3 Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments (1924) 
24 COL. L. REV. 563, 593; Beutel, The N. I. L. Should Not Be Amended 
(1932) 80 U. of PA. L. REV. 368, 384; BRANNAN op. cit. supra note 2, 
Preface VI; Douglas, The Applicability of the N. I. L. to Bonds (1925) 
25 COL. L. REV. 71; Kent, Some Further Necessary Amendments to the 
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From the technical side it is sought to bolster up this position 
by the assertion that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
in framing the Act, had in mind only three types of paper: notes, 
bills and checks.4 The Act was drafted to conform in the main 
to the English Bills of Exchange Act, which is specifically limited 
to such instruments. In the opinion of the English draftsman the 
law with regard to bonds and similar paper had not sufficiently 
crystallized to warrant codification.a But while scant, if any, 
mention was made of bonds by the Commissioners-the avail- 
able reports of the proceedings are very inadequate6-they de- 
liberately departed from the English precedent to make their 
Act, verbally at least, much broader in scope. The Act was 
called the Negotiable Instruments Law, not one concerning speci- 
fied instruments only, and began with the proposition that, "An 
instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following re- 
quirements." 7 The language was obviously too inclusive, taken 
literally, since all the discussion of the Commissioners discloses 
that there was no intention to cover bills of lading, stock cer- 
tificates and similar instruments. No doubt a modern realist of 
easy virtue would have few scruples in restricting the Act to 
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 22 ILL. L. REV. 833, 839; 
Kidd, The Negotiability of Bonds in California and the N. I. L. (1918) 
6 CAL. L. REV. 444; SMKITH AND MOORE, CASES ON BILLS AND NOTES (3d 
ed. 1931) 1, n. 1; Vernier, Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments 
Law (1929) 24 ILL. L. REV. 150, 153. 
4 See BRANNAN, loc. cit. supra note 2. But this argument is seriously 
weakened by the fact that Section 6 (4) refers to seals as not affecting 
negotiability and Section 65 (4) exempts the transferor of "public or cor- 
poration securities other than bills and notes" from the usual warranty as 
to the capacity of prior parties to contract. BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND 
CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) 35, n. 1. The point is now conceded: BRANNAN, 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932) ? 8. 
5 "The law relating to negotiable securities for money other than bills, 
notes, and cheques, is as yet very imperfectly developed, and is, therefore, 
unsuited for presentation in a codified form." CHALMERS, BILLS OF EX- 
CHANGE (6th ed. 1903) 316. 
6 At the 1893 meeting of the Commissioners in Milwaukee, Commissioner 
Stimson of Massachusetts read a short act which he had prepared "relating 
to bills of exchange and promissory notes." PROCEEDINGS OF THE COM- 
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1893) 203. At the previous session 
in New York an act relating to days of grace on promissory notes and 
bills of exchange had been introduced. PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONERS 
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1892) 115. At this meeting the point was 
raised as to whether the title should not be broadened to include all 
negotiable instruments but it met with the objection that the term might 
be understood in some states to include warehouse receipts and bills of 
lading, which obviously was not intended. No definite action was taken 
at these meetings since both acts were referred to the committee designated 
to study the whole subject and which later reported the present N. I. L. 
The detailed discussion of this act in committee and before the general 
council is not available. 
7N. I. L. ? 1. 
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instruments for the payment of money, or even to only such 
paper of that class as he might think proper-but for many, it 
would still be difficult to see how bonds could decently be ex- 
cluded in view of the generality of the term "negotiable instru- 
ment." 
The matter came before the New York Court of Appeals in 
1926 in the now famous Manhattan case,8 which involved in- 
terim certificates certifying that the bearer was entitled to re- 
ceive a bond of the Kingdom of Belgium "when, as and if deliv- 
ered to them [the signer] in definitive form by the obligor, and 
upon surrender of and in exchange for the certificate." Such 
paper was clearly not within the contemplation of the Com- 
missioners when the Negotiable Instruments Law was drafted. 
The court nevertheless decided, Judge Cardozo writing the opin- 
ion, that the Act applied, and that the paper was not negotiable, 
since the promise was conditional and the instrument was not 
payable in money. With this decision it obviously became futile 
to insist longer that the Act did not apply to bonds and similar 
paper; it was held to apply even to paper not payable in money. 
It is interesting to conjecture why such a result was reached by 
the court, but apparently at least one factor was reluctance to 
embark on a project of passing upon the negotiability of each 
of the many types of such instruments then in current use. The 
court was not prepared to legislate by wholesale; the work, it 
felt, could be handled more expeditiously by the legislature.9 
Hard upon the heels of the Manhattan case, legislation, con- 
sisting of three short paragraphs, was introduced in the New 
York legislature,10 by which it was sought to give some aspects 
of negotiability, not only to security receipts, already held non- 
negotiable by the court, but also to equipment trust certificates, 
which it was apparent would be found non-negotiable when 
similarly tested by litigation.1l The statute, known as the Hof- 
stadter Act, did not purport to be an amendment to the Negoti- 
8 President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N. Y. 38, 
150 N. E. 594 (1926). The case was criticized in Note (1926) 35 YALE 
L. J. 877, on the ground that the court should have excluded non-money 
instruments from the purview of the Act. 9 The court said: "So far as the Negotiable Instruments Law is con- 
cerned, the remedy for the evil, if it be one, is an amendment of the 
statute that will add to the negotiable instruments there enumerated or 
described such other classes as the law merchant or the custom of the 
market may from time to time establish. Until such an amendment shall 
be adopted, the courts in their decisions must take for granted that the 
Legislature is content with the law as it is written." Manhattan Co. v. 
Morgan, supra note 8, at 52, 150 N. E. at 599. 
10 N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1926) art. 8 ?? 260-262. For a 
critical analysis of this statute see Comment (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 884- 
891. 
11 See case cited infra note 69. 
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able Instruments Law, notwithstanding the decision of the court 
in the Manhattan case that the Act controlled, but was adopted 
and printed as part of the Personal Property Law. Formal 
requisites were made extremely liberal; any receipt entitling a 
person named therein or the bearer to specified securities of any 
sort, whether upon a contingency or not, was a security receipt 
within the statute. The definition of equipment trust certifi- 
cates, on the other hand, was so carefully circumscribed and lim- 
ited-for no apparent reason-as to admit of no possibility that 
newly developed instruments could come within its terms.12 The 
full purport of the statute then follows in the simple provision 13 
that a person to whom such an instrument has been transferred 
by any other person "for present or antecedent value14 and with- 
out notice of prior defenses or equities or claims of ownership 
enforcible against such other person,15 shall have absolute title 
thereto free of any defenses enforcible against the claims of 
ownership 16 of the signer or any prior holder." Obviously this 
was but a hasty grab for what was conceived to be the essence 
of negotiability and is excusable only as emergency legislation. 
The status of corporate bonds, however, was not affected. 
Shortly after this, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
undertook the project, long under consideration,17 of preparing 
a draft of amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law for 
12 "The term 'equipment trust certificate' means any writing in and by 
which the signer sets forth that the person named therein or the bearer 
is entitled to an interest or a share of a specified principal amount or 
par value in money in a trust under an identified trust indenture pursuant 
to the terms of which the title to rolling stock or equipment for use by 
or on the lines or routes of common carriers or to vessels or other marine 
equipment, is held by the trustees for the benefit of all the holders of 
the interests or shares." ? 260 (2). 
13 Section 261i (3). 
14 The term "antecedent value" is new and the question whether or not 
it includes a pledge for an old debt will probably precipitate unnecessary 
and expensive litigation. 
15 This provision omits the requirement of good faith found in all the 
uniform acts and usually insisted upon in the decisions. 
1e "Defenses enforcible against the claims of ownership" is almost un- 
intelligible. Moreover, if the provision excludes all defenses, such as 
defenses of forgery, alteration, ultra vires, illegality and so on it will go 
much further than the draftsmen probably intended or than would be 
justified by the decisions. 
17 Agitation for amendment began shortly after promulgation of the 
statute. See HANDBOOK, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI- 
FORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1900) 9; ibid. (1912) 81, 123; ibid. 
(1913) 36-38; ibid. (1919) 84, 144; ibid. (1923) 63, 243. The task was 
definitely undertaken in 1926; see ibid. (1926) 412. Citations to the large 
literature on the subject are collected in SMITH AND MOORE, op. cit. supra 
note 3, at 920; see generally Britton, Amendments to the Negotiable In- 
struments Law (1928) 22 ILL. L. REV. 815, and Turner, Revision of the 
Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 25. 
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general adoption. The first amendment proposed by Mr. Willis- 
ton, the draftsman, was to add the word "money" to the title 
of the Act 18 so that it should thereafter be restricted to instru- 
ments for the payment of money-thus, with one word exclud- 
ing interim certificates and the many other similar instruments, 
but apparently including bonds, debentures and equipment trust 
certificates, since they are payable in money. This was done to 
controvert the broad interpretation of the Act adopted by the 
court in the Manhattan case. In the following year the opening 
provision was inverted so as to provide merely that an instru- 
ment for the payment of money should be negotiable if it con- 
formed to certain requirements.19 This to meet the view that the 
statute should not be permitted to stifle future recognition of all 
instruments not conforming to express provisions of the Act. 
These suggested amendments, which have now been before the 
Commissioners at several readings, have met with general ap- 
proval. Clearly the exclusion from the Act of instruments not 
payable in money is desirable. But whether the loophole pro- 
vided by the proposed amendment to Section 1, while desirable as 
a general proposition, is a satisfactory way of treating bonds, 
debentures and such instruments, is extremely debatable. At best 
it is a purely negative solution and relies upon the courts to legis- 
late as cases are presented-a process which clearly should be 
possible, but which makes it very difficult to advise in advance on 
a particular security issue, unless, indeed, it conforms to the Act. 
Brief consideration of the cases, both prior and subsequent to 
the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law, throws con- 
siderable light on the question. State and corporate bonds, of the 
type so widely known today, made their appearance more than 
a century ago in the financing of canals and railroads.20 By 1840, 
corporate bonds similar to the modern instrument were being 
issued in considerable numbers,21 and by 1850, were daily listed 
on the Stock Exchanges. Such bonds, payable to bearer and un- 
der seal, were uniformly held negotiable.22 Citations and quota- 
18 Thus the title, as proposed by Mr. Williston, would read: "A General 
Act Relating to Negotiable Instruments for the Payment of Money," the 
underlined wording being new. HANDBOOK (1927) 623. 19 See HANDBOOK (1931) 221. The original provision read: "An instru- 
ment to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements." N. I. L. 
? 1. 
20 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 3, at 74. 
21 POOR, HISTORY OF RAILROADS AND CANALS (1860) 1 ff.; STETSON, SOME 
LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION, AND REGULATION 
(1917) 1-13. 
22 Ohio v. Van Home, 7 Ohio St. 327 (1837); Delafield v. Illinois, 2 
Hill 159 (N. Y. 1841); Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Fisher, 9 N. J. 
Eq. 667 (1855); Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136 (1859) ;,Commonwealth 
ex rel. Hamilton v. Select and Common Councils, 34 Pa. 496 (1859); 
Sturtevants v. Alton, Fed. Cas. No. 13,580, at 338 (C. C. 11. 1844); 
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tions, demonstrating the existence of a custom to deal in bonds 
as negotiable instruments, could be multiplied.23 Later, in the re- 
financing which took place following the panic of 1893, the trust 
mortgage, trust indenture, equipment trust agreement and simi- 
lar security devices came into prominence and the accompanying 
money instruments took substantially their present forms.24 
It has been asserted that bonds were originally held negotiable 
entirely without regard to the analogy to promissory notes.25 
Whether this was true or not to begin with, it is certain that, at 
least insofar as the draftsmen were concerned, the corporate 
bond and mortgage were regarded as merely an adaptation of 
the realty note and mortgage precedent.26 Indeed, except for the 
engraving, the size of the paper and similar matters, one is hard 
put to it today to specify any essential difference in form between 
the two instruments. True, bonds are issued in series and in 
even denominations, usually by corporations and for long periods, 
but, of course, notes may be issued under exactly similar circum- 
stances. However that may be, apparently the requirements of 
form were at; first conveniently vague, and instruments called 
bonds, if payable to bearer, were perforce negotiable. It was not 
long, however, before the courts were holding certain bonds non- 
negotiable at common law, and for reasons plainly culled from 
the law of commercial paper,27 though very little recognition of 
Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83 (1863); Chapin v. Vermont and 
Massachusetts R. R., 74 Mass. 575 (1857); Bunting v. Camden and At- 
lantic R. R., 81 Pa. 254 (1876); Junction R. R. v. Cleneay, 13 Ind. 161 
(1859); Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539 (1858). 
23 See TOWNSEND, ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF LAW GOVERNING THE TRANSFER 
OF MONETARY SECURITIES (1898) 11; JONES, CORPORATE BONDS AND MORT- 
GAGES (3d ed. 1907) ?? 184-185; 2 DANIELS, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
(6th ed. 1913) ? 1486; White v. Vermont and Massachusetts R. R., 21 
How. 575 (1858). 
24 It is interesting to note that at the very time this development was 
taking place the Negotiable Instruments Law was just being drafted. 
25 DOUGLAS, loc. cit. supra note 3; JONES, op. cit. supra note 23, ? 185. 
But cf. Ide v. Passumpsic & Connecticut Rivers R. R., 32 Vt. 297 (1859) 
where it was said that bonds "are called bonds, or railroad bonds, but 
they are in fact, both the bonds and the coupons, mere bills or notes, and 
as strictly negotiable as bank bills;" and 4 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 
1923) ? 767, where it is surmised that the seal may have been "looked 
upon as merely the signature of the corporation, thus making the instru- 
ment one not under seal and hence a negotiable note." 
26 For a discussion of the evolution of the corporate mortgage and bond 
from the simple forms employed by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Com- 
pany in 1846 and by the New York and Erie Railroad in 1847, the latter 
involving an issue of $3,000,000, to the present involved forms, see STET- 
SON, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1. 
27 Knight v. Wilmington and Manchester R. R., 1 Jones 357 (N. C. 
1854) (promise in addition to the payment of money); Ledwich v. McKim, 
53 N. Y. 307 (1873) (incomplete); Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 434 (1878) 
(uncertainty of amount); Cronin v. Patrick County, 89 Fed. 79 (C. C. W. D. 
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this fact is evinced by modern writers.28 
Since the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the 
separate recognition of bonds as negotiable paper has become 
exceedingly difficult. Many cases, it is true, have hastily as- 
sumed the negotiability of the instrument in suit and proceeded 
to a consideration of other questions as controlled by the Act.29 
But when the question of form has been squarely faced, proof of 
custom and of commercial demand for negotiability, though rec- 
ognized to exist, have been generally excluded.30 In the large 
number of cases where bonds, after comparison with the require- 
ments of the statute, have been held negotiable,31 the courts have 
Va. 1882) (words of negotiability); Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290 (1879) 
(uncertainty of time); Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507 (1860) 
(coupons with no words of negotiability); McClelland v. Norfolk Southern 
R. R., 110 N. Y. 469, 18 N. E. 237 (1888) (conditional promise); and 
see Lockrow v. Cline, 4 Kan. App. 716, 46 Pac. 720 (1896) (mortgage 
made a part of real estate note in form of a coupon bond); Merriweather 
v. Saline County, Fed. Cas. No. 9,485 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1878) (not promise 
to pay money); Blackman v. Lehman, Durr & Co., 63 Ala. 547 (1879) 
(payable upon a contingency). 
28 See, for example, Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable 
Instruments (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 563, 580. 
29 In re Footville Condensed Milk Co., 229 Fed. 698 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916); 
Crittenden v. Widrevitz, 272 Fed. 871 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Murray v. 
Wagner, 277 Fed. 32 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Pridgen v. Baugh & Sons Co., 
30 F. (2d) 353 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Brown v. Southwestern Farrh Mort- 
gage Co., 112 Kan. 192, 210 Pac. 658 (1922); First National Bank v. 
Brown, 117 Kan. 339, 230 Pac. 1038 (1924); Parks v. Hughes, 157 La. 
914, 103 So. 261 (1925); Adrian v. Whitney Central National Bank, 180 
Mich. 171, 146 N. W. 654 (1914); Union Trust Co. v. Tonquish Temple 
Association, 247 Mich. 36, 225 N. W. 572 (1929); Linbarger v. West New 
York, 83 N. J. L. 446, 85 Atl. 235 (1912); Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N. Y. 
168, 155 N. E. 88 (1926); Gruntal v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty 
Co., 254 N. Y. 468, 173 N. E. 682 (1930); Interboro Brewing Co. v. Doyle, 
165 App. Div. 646, 151 N. Y. Supp. 325 (3d Dep't 1915); Harter v. 
Peoples Bank of Buffalo, 221 App. Div. 122, 223 N. Y. Supp. 118 (4th 
Dep't 1927); Morris v. Muir, 111 Misc. 739, 181 N. Y. Supp. 913 (Mun. Ct. 
1920); Dengler v. Paul, 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 37 (1924); Irwin v. Bedford 
County, 151 Tenn. 402, 270 S. W. 81 (1924); Crum v. Hanna, 140 Va. 
366, 125 S. E. 219 (1924); Stuart Court Realty Corp. v. Gillespie, 150 
Va. 515, 143 S. E. 741 (1928); Brokaw v. Kunze, 127 Wash. 593, 221 Pac. 
590 (1923). So also as to coupons detached from bonds. Town of New- 
bern v. National Bank, 234 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916); Wilson Adv. 
Corp. v. Renwick, 197 Ill. App. 490 (1916); Nuzman v. Bennett, 115 Kan. 
766, 224 Pac. 900 (1924); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Kusterer, 156 
Miss. 22, 125 So. 429 (1930); Greene v. Minzesheimer, 110 N. Y. Supp. 
429 (App. Term, 1908). 
30 King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481, 198 N. W. 798 (1924); 
Grosfield v. First Nat. Bank, 73 Mont. 219, 236 Pac. 250 (1925); Manker 
v. American Savings Bank and Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 Pac. 406 
(1924); Drouineau v. First Nat. Bank, 244 Ill. App. 251 (1927). 
31 Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108 (1907) (fund for pay- 
ment limited); Higgins v. Hocking Valley, Railway, 188 App. Div. 684, 
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too often been forced to resort to a strained or unreal construc- 
tion of the Act or of the terms of the particular instrument, in 
order to reach the result desired-too often certainly to permit 
one to take much pride in this corner of the law of commercial 
paper.32 
In view of this development, both before and since the Act, it 
is extremely doubtful whether the proposed amendment to Sec- 
tion 1, asking the courts to take up anew the question of form in 
the case of bonds, debentures and similar instruments, will prove 
particularly helpful; the habit of classifying bonds with other 
commercial paper for the payment of money is of too long stand- 
ing. After all, who can say when an instrument is new, or when 
merely an old one with a new provision infringing one of the 
requirements of form usual to negotiable paper for the payment 
of money? The line is by no means easy to draw and, if nothing 
further were to be done, we could look forward with some con- 
fidence to a decided lack of uniformity on a point which should 
be very clear. Moreover, even assuming the proposed amend- 
ment when adopted would not become lost in the shuffle, a dis- 
tinct possibility,33 it assumes, factually, that instruments of this 
type are still not sufficiently definitive in form to admit of spe- 
cific recognition, a point of questionable validity. 
At this stage the situation has interesting philosophical as- 
pects:.shall we let things continue to evolve slowly, merely free- 
ing the courts as proposed, so that the law may be built up case 
177 N. Y. Supp. 444 (1st Dep't 1919) (reference to indenture, tax-free 
covenant, acceleration); Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N. Y. 263, 164 N. E. 45 
(1928) (reference to mortgage, acceleration, redemption, sinking fund); 
Paepcke v. Paine, 253 Mich. 636, 235 N. W. 871 (1931) (reference to 
indenture, holders' right to sue denied) ; Bank of California v. National 
City Co., 138 Wash. 517, 244 Pac. 690, on rehearing, 141 Wash. 243, 251 
Pac. 561 (1926) (tax-free covenant, reference to mortgage, acceleration, 
redemption); Weber v. Keith Railway Equipment Co., 248 Ill. App. 258 
(1928) (reference to security); Commissioners of Cleveland County v. Bank 
of Gastonia, 157 N. C. 191, 72 S. E. 996 (1911) (limitation on taxes 
leviable for payment). These cases, the cases in note 12 and others similar 
thereto are considered more in detail infrat. 
32 EATON, EXPLANATORY OUTLINE OF FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF 
BANKERS, TRUSTEES, REGISTRARS, TRANSFER AGENTS AND LAWYERS IN CON- 
NECTION WITH THE ISSUE OF INVESTMENT SECURITES (1928) 7: "In this 
respect, probably far above all others, substantial developments should be 
expected and are needed to an extent rarely realized in full by any of 
the groups referred to, even by many experienced corporation lawyers." 
Stetson, op. cit. supra note 21, 66 ff.; 2 MACHEN, CORPORATIONS (1908) 
? 1740 A; (1928) 42 HARV. L. REV. 700. 
33In a survey of the thousands of cases dealing with bills and notes 
decided within the last five years it is estimated that in more than one- 
third the courts have failed entirely to cite the Act. Beutel, The Necessity 
of a New Technique of Interpreting the N. I. L.-The Civil Law Analogy 
(1931) 6 TULANE L. REV. 1, 5. 
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by case, or shall we hasten the process by definitive legislation? 
In New York, after the decision of the Court of Appeals in Enoch 
v. Brandon,34 certain interests, at least, had little doubt as to the 
proper course to pursue. In that case the court had, by a bit of 
tight-rope walking, successfully sustained the negotiability of 
the bonds before it; but it had also said distinctly that bonds 
to be negotiable must conform to the Negotiable Instruments 
Law, and it was questionable whether other issues then outstand- 
ing could meet that test. As a consequence, prompt steps were 
taken to include corporate bonds within the provisions of the 
Hofstadter Act, the legislation originally designed to cover se- 
curity receipts and equipment trust certificates.35 For good meas- 
ure it was further provided, ex post facto, that the act should be 
construed to validate the negotiability of instruments issued 
prior to the effective date of the statute-a somewhat sanguine 
proposition at best. 
That this was even worse stop-gap legislation is only too ap- 
parent,36 although it does testify to the urgency of the case. It 
may now be said, however, that bonds of the ordinary variety 
are triply negotiable in New York, first by common law, next by 
the Negotiable Instruments Law, and lastly by the Hofstadter 
Act, unless the latter, being a later act specifically dealing with 
bonds, has limited the application of the Negotiable Instruments 
Law. The point is as yet undetermined. Since the provisions of 
the two Acts not only differ in many ways, but the one omits 
many provisions found in the other, the situation is one which 
cannot help but bring pain to the orderly soul in search for 
certainty. 
Moreover, even if carefully drafted special legislation should 
be prepared for uniform adoption, a proposal which has many 
proponents,37 is it at all clear that interim certificates, security 
receipts, equipment trust certificates and corporate bonds should 
all be treated together in a separate act? If so, might not munic- 
ipal warrants, dock receipts, tax anticipation notes, sewer assess- 
ment bonds, stock purchase warrants, delivery orders and even 
registered bonds 38 be included equally well? The argument for 
separate legislation is that all such paper is cut to a different 
pattern from that used for notes, bills and checks, a proposition 
34Supra note 31. 
35N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1930) art. 8, ?? 260-262. 
36 The Act as applied to bonds is critically discussed in Comment (1930) 
40 YALE L. J. 261. 
37 To be known as a Uniform Negotiable Securities Act and as such 
favored, with varying degrees of conviction, by most of the writers cited 
supra note 3. 
38 Subsequent to the decision in the Manhattan case, Mr. J. V. Kline 
of the New York Bar prepared a list of some 68 corporate securities of 
one form or another, which might well be considered in such a project. 
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one is inclined to agree with, at least as applied to security re- 
ceipts. Furthermore, it is said, such paper is traded in by bro- 
kers in the financial district in New York, though no one has 
pointed out just what significance that factor has. Finally, to 
annihilate any possible opposition, it is asserted that "func- 
tionally" such paper is quite different from bills, notes and 
checks. All in all, one is reluctantly brought to the conclusion 
that the argument is almost wholly emotional, at least as applied 
to bonds, possibly another manifestation of the hostile attitude 
toward the Negotiable Instruments Law made fashionable by 
Dean Ames some thirty-odd years ago and now but slowly giving 
way. 
This insistence upon functional difference, however, deserves 
further consideration. What is referred to, the transaction giv- 
ing rise to the paper or the use to be made of it? Obviously the 
transactions giving rise to notes differ in many respects from 
those giving rise to corporate bonds, but that is also true of notes 
and checks, the one being used in credit operations, the other as 
a payment device. Indeed, there may be wide disparity in the 
transactions underlying any two notes identical in form. On 
the other hand, there is broad functional similarity as to all of 
such paper in that any of it may be sold or used as collateral. 
The question of how bonds, debentures, equipment trust cer- 
tificates and similar paper should be classified for purposes of 
legislation probably should be determined from the standpoint 
of convenience in drafting. It is particularly evident from this 
angle that the matter of first moment is to determine exactly 
what is sought to be accomplished. The generality that such 
paper should be made negotiable is not enough, since the word 
negotiable has no precise content.39 Ordinarily it is assumed 
that the incident of chief significance-aside from mere trans- 
ferability, which is now principally of historical interest-is the 
right of a purchaser from a thief to retain the paper and en- 
force payment of it.40 But it is fully as important to the maker 
that payment in good faith, if made to the thief himself, for 
example, constitute a discharge, one of many points not con- 
sidered in the Hofstadter Act.41 Again, according to the common 
law rule alteration avoided the instrument, but it is now settled 
that the bona fide purchaser may recover according to the origi- 
39 The unkind reception given by the courts to the early statutes declar- 
ing bills of lading to be "negotiable" is a case in point. See Shaw v. 
Railroad Co., 101 U. S, 557, 563 (1879). 
40 "The only advantage over non-negotiability is that the purchaser from 
a thief is protected. Claims of legal and equitable title and defenses may 
be cut off by estoppel." Beutel, op. cit. seupra note 2, at 383. 
41 Cothran v. Collins, 29 How. Pr. 113 (N. Y. 1864). 
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nal tenor,42 a result which has now become an incident of nego- 
tiability as definitely established as the points first named. Many 
other illustrations, for example, the rules concerning presump- 
tions and burden of proof, warranties upon transfer and similar 
matters, could be given. 
In fact, realistically speaking, negotiability as applied to money 
instruments may well be assumed today to denote all of those 
incidents wherein the law as to bills and notes varies from that 
applicable to ordinary contracts. So defined, negotiability as ap- 
plied to stock certificates, bills of lading and similar paper, is in 
many respects quite a different thing-as is recognized by the 
vague expression "quasi negotiable" sometimes used. Oddly 
enough, none of the proponents of special legislation appears to 
have made an item by item canvass to determine what should be 
included in special legislation concerning bonds, or, for that 
matter, what, if any, of the provisions of the present Negotiable 
Instruments Law are not satisfactory. 
It seems safe to say, however, that the gulf between money 
instruments, of whatever type, and security receipts, for exam- 
ple, is much broader from the drafting viewpoint than that be- 
tween bills, notes and checks, which, however broad, has been 
rather successfully bridged by the Negotiable Instruments Law. 
Many provisions inappropriate to a security receipt are needed to 
write a contract for the payment of money, and legislation may 
well be visualized as forming part of the contract. In addition 
to those already mentioned, the rules concerning date of pay- 
ment, days of grace, the effect of transfer after maturity and 
many others could be instanced. The problem whether a cor- 
poration should be liable for interest upon a matured bond after 
depositing the proper funds at the place of payment is a further 
illustration.43 Again, the well established rule that a purchaser, 
who has given value in the shape of bank credit, may only re- 
cover to the extent that the account has been drawn against, 
affords a somewhat nicer adjustment in the case of money instru- 
ments than has been found possible in regard to others.44 It was 
42 N. I. L. ? 124. For a good discussion of the early cases applying 
note law on these points to bonds, see, City of Elizabeth v. Force, 29 N. J. 
Eq. 587 (1878) and note. No question appears to have been raised look- 
ing to a distinctive treatment of bonds. 
43 According to ? 70, N. I. L., such facts, at least as applied to a note, 
would constitute a tender of payment relieving the maker thereafter of 
liability for interest but, according to most authority, the account would be 
maintained at all times at the risk of the maker (depositor). Federal In- 
termediate Credit Bank v. Epstin, 151 S. C. 67, 148 S. E. 713 (1929). 
See (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 277 for discussion. Further, such funds probably 
would not be held to constitute a trust fund for payment to bond and 
coupon holders in event of failure of the issuing corporation. See in re 
Interborough Consol. Corp., 288 Fed. 334 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923). 
44 Section 54, N. I. L. The arguments pro and con as to the policy of this 
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perhaps for reasons of this character that Mr. Williston designed 
his first two proposed amendments to the Negotiable Instruments 
Law to drive a wedge between money paper on the one hand and 
all other types on the other.45 
Moreover, it is apparent from the foregoing summary of is- 
sues that bonds will be found rather agreeable bedfellows when 
grouped with notes, bills and checks. Also one should not lose 
sight of the fact that during the thirty years or more within 
which the courts have actually regarded bonds and notes as be- 
ing controlled by identical legislation, there has been very little 
question concerning any of these points. The difficulty has been 
almost solely with the requirements of form: how to draw long 
term money obligations to comply with sections 1 to 10 of the 
Act. That some difficulty in this connection should exist is not 
surprising when it is remembered that bonds, debentures and 
similar instruments were themselves only just taking their mod- 
ern form at the time the Act was drafted. 
The pertinent inquiry today, therefore, would first seem to be 
to determine what changes in these few sections would have to 
be made to bring bonds, debentures, equipment trust certificates 
and similar money obligations clearly within the Statute. In so 
doing it should not be assumed that new paper may not be de- 
veloped in future, but merely that the form of these instruments, 
after thirty or more years of use, has now so far crystalized that 
there should no longer be any doubt as to their status. It is, 
accordingly, proposed, in what follows, to make a detailed study 
of the cases in which the question of negotiable form has been 
litigated and to propose such amendment to the Act as seems 
necessary. 
References to Security Agreement 
The most prolific source of litigation concerning the negotiability 
of bonds has undoubtedly been the clauses referring the holder 
to the mortgage indenture or other security agreement. Designed 
in part to identify the particular bonds entitled to share in the 
security, they have also, of necessity, been drawn to commit the 
holder to the terms of the indenture, not only to define his rights 
section are stated in BRANNAN, 410-411. Such a provision is obviously un- 
workable in the case of commodity or security paper since the subject mat- 
ter may not have a par value or be divisible. There is thus no comparable 
provision in the Uniform Sales Act. As to when bank credit should be re- 
garded as value see ? 29, Uniform Bank Collection Act (third tentative 
draft), HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1931) 271. 
45 Mr. Williston makes express mention of "corporate bonds" in connec- 
tion with the proposed amendment to ? 5 of the N. I. L. HANDBOOK 
(1927) 630. 
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in the security, but to clarify or limit his rights upon the bonds 
themselves.46 These latter provisions, found usually in the secur- 
ity agreement, take various forms; typical is the provision lodg- 
ing with the trustee sole power to sue upon the bonds, ordinarily 
with no obligation to bring suit except upon the demand of 
holders of a specified number of bonds. On the policy side such 
provisions are probably desirable, since, by avoiding a multi- 
plicity of suits by holders racing for preference upon default 
and "strike suits" pending reorganization, fairer treatment can 
be accorded the general body of creditors.47 The technical diffi- 
culty is that the Negotiable Instruments Law requires an "un- 
conditional promise" to pay a sum certain in money.48 
The draftsman for a bond issue is thus faced with a dilemma. 
On the one hand, the reference may be so ambiguous as not 
effectively to prevent an individual holder from resorting to in- 
dependent action antagonistic to the welfare of the group of se- 
curity holders similarly situated.49 On the other, the provision 
may be so explicitly worded as to obviously condition the maker's 
promise, thus rendering the instrument not negotiable as a mat- 
46 STETSON, op. cit. supra note 21, at 16. 
47Ibid. 41, 47; EATON, op. cit. supra note 32, at 6; See Home Mortgage 
Co. v. Ramsey, 49 F. (2d) 738, 743 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), where it was 
said: "The provisions are merely reasonable conditions precedent to the 
right of the plaintiff to bring the suit herself. They are intended for the 
security of all the bondholders and no doubt rendered the bonds more 
salable. They were designed for just such a case as is presented here, 
where one bondholder, or a small minority, is determined upon action 
which a large majority believe hostile to their interests." 
48 Sections 1, 3, 184. 
49 See Guilford v. Minneapolis, S. Ste. M. and A. Ry., 48 Minn. 560, 51 
N. W. 658 (1891); Berman v. Consolidated Nevada-Utah Corp., 132 Misc. 
462, 230 N. Y. Supp. 421 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (the reference was "for a 
statement of the nature and extent of the security, the rights of the 
holders of the bonds, and the terms and conditions upon which the bonds 
are issued and secured"); Rothschild v. Rio-Grande Western Ry., 84 Hun. 
103, 32 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1st Dep't 1905) (semble); General Investment Co. 
v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 200 App. Div. 794, 193 N. Y. Supp. 
903 (1st Dep't 1922). 
On the other hand in Lidgerwood v. Hale & Kilborn Corp., 47 F. (2d) 
318 (S. D. N. Y. 1930), the indenture restrictions against individual suit 
were held binding upon the holder, but here the clause read "This note . . . 
is entitled to all the benefits and subject to all the provisions of an agree- 
ment . . . to which agreement reference is hereby made for a description 
of the rights of the holders . . . and the terms and conditions upon which 
said notes are issued . . . to all the provisions whereof the registered 
owner or holder, by acceptance hereof, assents." Accord, Allan v. Moline 
Plow Co., 14 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). It may be said without 
hesitation, however, that the instruments before the court in each case were 
non-negotiable since the promise is almost certainly conditional. In the 
former case, the court distinguished Enoch v. Brandon, supra note 3, by 
saying "This is not a case where the reference to an indenture was such 
as to lead the holder to believe that the indenture simply added more 
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ter of form. This latter possibility is particularly dangerous 
where a broad phrase such as "subject to" 5, has been used in 
the bond, not only because it verbally imports a condition, but 
because in such case a court may construe bond and mortgage 
together to determine negotiable form, a procedure which is usu- 
ally fatal to negotiability.51 The usual view, apart from such 
clauses, is that negotiable form will be judged solely from an 
inspection of the instrument itself,52 the actual terms of the in- 
denture being deemed irrelevant to that inquiry. 
A variety of clauses have been drafted to meet the situation 
and a variety of results have come from the courts. In the lead- 
ing case of King Cattle Company v. Joseph,53 the reference clause 
read: 
"issued under and in pursuance of and are all equally secured by and are 
subject to an indenture . . . and hereby reference is made to said indenture 
and the same is made part hereof with the same effect as if herein set 
forth." 
Excluding evidence of a custom of negotiability, the court held 
that the "subject to" clause of itself rendered the promise condi- 
tional. In an earlier case, Saint Louis-Carterville Coal Company 
v. Southern Coal and Mining Company,54 bonds were likewise 
held not negotiable because of the conditional character of the 
promise, although the reference clause was more cautiously 
worded than in the King Cattle Company case. The provision 
read as follows: 
rights to what he had on the face of the note . . . ," and in the latter, 
the recital was said to make the trust agreement "a part and parcel of 
the terms of the notes as effectively as if they were written into the notes 
themselves." See note (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 312. 
50 HORR, TRUST MORTGAGE FORMS (1929) 622-643, recommends as safe: 
"This bond is one of a series . . . issued in accordance with and equally 
secured by a mortgage or deed of trust . . . ;" and warns against the use 
of "under" or "subject to" in place of "in accordance with." 
51 For bond cases see notes 53 and 54, infra. As to notes, see Hubbard 
v. Wallace Co., 201 Ia. 1143, 208 N. W. 730 (1926); Lockrow v. Cline, 4 
Kan. App. 716, 46 Pac. 720 (1896); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 247 
N. Y. 538, 161 N. E. 173 (1928), mem. aff'g 219 App. Div. 771, 220 N. Y. 
Supp. 893 (1st Dep't 1926), mem. aff'g 126 Misc. 375, 213 N. Y. Supp. 536 
(Sup. Ct. 1926). In the case last cited the court appears to have considered 
the words "subject to" sufficient to destroy negotiability regardless of what 
was contained in the collateral instrument. For discussion see (1928) 37 
YALE L. J. 665. 
52 See, for example, in the case of notes, Thorp v. Mindeman, 123 Wis. 
149, 101 N. W. 417 (1904). 
53158 Minn. 481, 198 N. W. 798 (1924). 
54194 Mo. App. 598, 186 S. W. 1152 (1916). To the same effect see 
Mississippi P. and L. Co. v. Kusterer & Co., 156 Miss. 22, 125 So. 429 
(1930). 
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"for the nature and extent of the security, rights of the holders of bonds, 
and the terms and conditions upon which the bonds are issued and secured, 
reference is made to the said mortgage. .. ." 
On the other hand the court in Enoch v. Brandon55 found 
bonds negotiable which contained the following reference clause: 
"all equally secured by and entitled to the benefits of and subject to the 
provisions [of a mortgage] to which reference is hereby made for a descrip- 
tion of the property mortgaged and pledged, the nature and extent of the 
security, the rights of the holders of the bonds with respect thereto . . . 
and the terms and conditions upon which said bonds are issued and secured." 
The court interpreted the phrase dealing with the rights of the 
holders and also the reference to the conditions upon which the 
bonds were issued as affecting the security only.56 This interpre- 
tation seems to open the door wide enough to permit a draftsman 
to insert in the indenture any conditions he wishes upon the 
principal obligation contained in the bond without thereby af- 
fecting the matter of negotiable form, although it is quite pos- 
sible that the court, when faced with the issue, would close it 
again to deny that such conditions were binding on the bona fide 
purchaser.57 Certainly it cannot be said that the present situa- 
tion is a happy one; it should be possible at least to set at rest, 
both as to bonds and other forms of money paper, the question 
whether a reference to a separate writing for a statement of the 
holders' rights concerning the security destroys negotiability.58 
To sanction such clauses, however, does not get at the heart 
of the matter, the extent to which the mortgage provisions are 
to be allowed to condition the obligation of the bond. When do 
55 Supra note 31. 
56 When the reference clause admits of this interpretation there has been 
little difficulty. See Bank of California v. National City Co., supra note 31. 
Accord: Guilford v. Minneapolis, etc., Ry., supra note 49; Brown v. Michi- 
gan Ry., 124 Misc. 630, 207 N. Y. Supp. 630 (City Ct. 1924). And so with 
notes. Chelsea Exchange Bank v. Warner, 202 App. Div. 499, 195 N. Y. 
Supp. 419 (1st Dep't 1922). The clause, "the conditions upon which said 
bonds are issued," would seem to come perilously close to conditioning the 
principal promise, but there was prior authority in accord with the inter- 
pretation adopted in Enoch v. Brandon. See Higgins v. Hocking Valley 
Ry., supra note 31, and Weber v. Keith Railway Equipment Co., supra 
note 31. 
57 Cases cited supra note 49, particularly Rothschild v. Rio-Grande West- 
ern Ry. 
58 This suggestion was made a year ago to the present draftsman in 
charge of N. I. L. amendments, Mr. Llewellyn, and. took shape as sub- 
section C to ? 3, reading as follows: 
"Section 3.-When promise is unconditional.-An unqualified order or 
promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this act, though 
coupled with: C. A statement of, or a reference to a separate writing 
for a statement of, the holder's rights concerning any security for the in- 
strument." 
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limitations on the holder's rights leave off and conditions upon 
the maker's obligations begin? In a recent case, Paepcke v. 
Paine,59 the Michigan court, following the lead of the court in 
Enoch v. Brwndon, held negotiable an instrument containing a 
provision that: 
"to the extent provided in the said Trust Agreement, all rights of action 
upon this Debenture are vested in the Trustee." 
The court stated the familiar rule that negotiable form is to be 
ascertained from inspection of the instrument alone and so re- 
frained from examining the trust agreement. It then surmised 
that the provision was a beneficial one, since it probably oper- 
ated merely to restrain individual suit and did not give any in- 
timation that the promise to pay or the time of payment was in 
any way affected. Had it been shown that under the indenture 
the time of payment, for example, could be deferred, not an un- 
known provision,"6 or entirely waived under certain conditions,61 
it is not clear what the court would have done. In a remote sense 
even such provisions might be said to enhance security rights- 
that is, of the group, though possibly not of the individual holder. 
At all events, it is quite clear that if such references are deemed 
binding on the holder the instrument in any realistic sense be- 
comes a conditional one-and, within the spirit of the Negotiable 
Instruments Law, not negotiable. However much one may admire 
the ingenuity of the courts in handling the problem thus far, 
although their technique is suspiciously like that of an ostrich, 
it is quite apparent that the policy question whether conditions 
in long term investment paper are inimical to negotiability will 
have to be faced squarely sooner or later.62 
Payment out of Particular Assets 
The long established rule, applicable generally to bills and notes, 
59Supra note 31 (issue, replevin by real owner against bona fide pur- 
chaser). 
60 See McClelland v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 110 N. Y. 469, 18 N. E. 237 
(1888), where this fact was said to be sufficient to render bond and coupon 
non-negotiable. 
61 In Siebenhauer v. Bank of Cal. Nat. Ass'n, 211 Cal. 239, 294 Pac. 1062 
(1930), Water Company bonds were drawn so that in event the city pur- 
chased company land the latter's obligation on the bonds would terminate. 
The bonds were held negotiable for purposes of protecting a bona fide pur- 
chaser, but this was pursuant to special legislation making bonds negotiable 
"notwithstanding any condition therein or in the mortgage, deed of trust or 
other instrument securing the same." 
62 The conditions question is also important in the case of equipment trust 
certificate and certain municipal issues, as well as in the case of coupons, 
and further discussion will accordingly be deferred until those cases have 
been presented. 
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that a negotiable instrument may not be made payable out of a 
particular fund,63 has operated to render non-negotiable two im- 
portant types of investment securities and to raise considerable 
doubt as to the status of a third. It has been the underlying as- 
sumption, that all negotiable paper must be prepared to circulate 
as money that has proved the stumbling block. In long term 
paper, designed for investment purposes, there would seem to 
be no policy reason for a strict application of such a rule; a 
maker of investment paper should be permitted to limit payment 
to such funds as he may deem proper, provided only the limita- 
tion is plainly stated on the face of the instrument. 
The futility of attempting to regulate the form of investment 
paper by the simple requirements stated in the N. I. L. is well 
borne out by the case of municipal bonds, which, though long 
regarded as negotiable by the investing public,64 continue to be 
held non-negotiable by the courts. In a typical case 65 a city is- 
sued its bonds promising to pay to bearer 
"out of the fund . . . known as Local Improvement Fund District No. 3032 
and not otherwise [giving the holder no claim] except from the special 
assessment made for the improvement for which such bond was issued." 
Despite evidence of a custom of negotiability, the bonds were 
held non-negotiable.66 Again, bonds containing the following 
clause, 
"pay to bearer . . . as authorized by Resolution No. 1123 . . . creating 
Special Improvement District No. 196 .... This bond is payable from the 
collection of a special tax or assessment . . . within the Improvement 
District." 
were held to be non-negotiable, even though the clause did not 
specifically say that the bonds were payable "only" out of the 
63 N. I. L. ? 3. "But an order or promise to pay out of a particular 
fund is not unconditional." 
64 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) ? 879. And see the 
following cases where municipal issues were held negotiable, no point being 
made that payment was limited to any particular tax or fund, if such was 
the fact: Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539 (U. S. 1858) (by es- 
toppel); Mercer County v. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83 (U. S. 1863) (fully nego- 
tiable); Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 51 (1877). 
65 Manker v. American Savings Bank and Trust Co. supra note 30 (issue: 
rights of bona fide purchaser in stolen bonds). 66 Accord: Drouineau v. First Nat. Bank, supra note 30. Such special 
improvement bonds had very generally been held non-negotiable even before 
the N. I. L., at least as to defenses raised by the maker. Northern Trust 
Co. v. Wilmette, 220 Ill. 417, 77 N. E. 169 (1906); Washington County v. 
Williams, 111 Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901); Kirsch v. Braun, 153 Ind. 
247, 53 N. E. 1082 (1899); Morrison v. Austin State Bank, 213 Ill. 472, 
72 N. E. 1109 (1904); Note (1924) 42 A. L. R. 1027. 
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designated fund.67 The upshot of the matter is that to deny nego- 
tiability to paper of this type not only serves no apparent pur- 
pose but violates the general understanding of all parties in- 
volved. 
Equipment trust certificates, which likewise may meet all the 
other requirements of negotiable form specified in the Negotiable 
Instruments Law, are usually held to fall before the particular 
fund provision of Section 3. By this financing device, the trustee 
for an issue generally acknowledges the holder's interest and 
promises that 
"the principal amount ... is payable to bearer [on a day certain] at the 
office of the trustee . . . but only from and out of rentals received from a 
certain lease of railroad equipment. .. ." 68 
The promise of the actual borrower (the railroad), though suffi- 
ciently unconditional, is phrased merely as a guarantee of full 
payment of certificate and rentals. Obviously this does not meet 
the technical requirements of form, and such instruments are 
accordingly held non-negotiable.69 While this result is unim- 
peachable under the Act, it is again contrary to good sense.70 
The third situation concerns bonds issued by business trusts, 
67 Jones v. American Savings Bank and Trust Co., 139 Wash. 598, 247 
Pac. 1017 (1926). One judge concurred in the opinion for the reason 
stated. Another concurred separately, regretting that he felt bound by the 
Manker case, supra note 30, in which he had dissented. Another failed 
to find a determinable future time. Another dissented, but a question as 
to the law controlling forced him to concur in the result. Three judges 
dissented on the theory that the provision merely indicated a fund for 
reimbursement, not a particular fund for payment. 
It had formerly been held in Washington that the bona fide purchaser 
could be protected upon principles of estoppel, Cuddy v. Sturtevant, 111 
Wash. 304, 190 Pac. 909 (1920), but this may no longer be possible since 
the Manker case. See State ex rel. Larson v. Vancouver, 160 Wash. 655, 
295 Pac. 947 (1930). The result may be to force municipalities to accept 
this curb on their power to contract. See Keck v. Yakima Savings & Loan 
Ass'n., 160 Wash. 430, 295 Pac. 483 (1931), where the provision read, "This 
bond is one of a series aggregating $275,000.00 par value in amount, pay- 
able out of the Yakima County Road Refunding Bond Fund . . . and is a 
general obligation of said county." When it has been possible to interpret 
the provision as a general undertaking on the part of the issuer, the in- 
strument has been held negotiable, though often the construction has lacked 
reality. Cleveland County v. Bank of Gastonia, supra note 31; Rutledge v. 
Sewer District 139 S. C. 188, 137 S. E. 597 (1927). 
68 For another more carefully drawn form, see HORR, op. cit. supra note 
50, at 593-610, but it would be open to the same objection, that payment is 
made subject to the terms of the lease. 
69 Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Andrews, 244 Mich. 159, 221 N. W. 
114 (1928). 
70 Some four hundred and sixty listed equipment trusts had certificates 
on the security markets as of January 16, 1931. FREEMAN AND CO., EQUIP- 
MENT TRUST SECURITIES (13th ed. 1931). 
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estates, joint stock associations and similar unincorporated or- 
ganizations where it is customary for the signers to limit per- 
sonal responsibility. The difficulty is due not so much to the Act 
as to the uncertainty concerning the status of the issuing organi- 
zation. If it is not to be regarded as a separate entity, then it 
can be argued that the signers or their principals are personally 
liable and the exemption would therefore operate to make the 
instrument payable out of a particular fund-that is, the assets 
of the organization in the popular sense. There have been very 
few cases raising the point. In the leading case of Hibbs v. 
Brown,71 the court unanimously, but for a variety of reasons, 
held joint stock association bonds to be negotiable, notwithstand- 
ing a clause limiting all recourse to the assets of the association 
and exempting the members from personal liability. The most 
widespread opinion in the court appeared to be that the associa- 
tion was an entity and, since its whole assets were obligated, the 
personal exemption did not infringe the Act.72 Recently, in 
Charles Nelson Company v. Morton,73 the California court 
reached a similar result in a case involving notes issued by a 
business trust, notwithstanding that the trustees, who were 
otherwise liable as partners and were the only persons incurring 
responsibility under the promise,74 were exempted from personal 
responsibility.75 The result, which no doubt would apply equally 
71 Supra note 31. The case has been criticized as bad law insofar as it 
concerns business organization theory, but unquestionably reached a desir- 
able result. See, (1906) 19 HARV. L. REV. 616; WARREN, CORPORATE ADVAN- 
TAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929) 470-500; Dodd, Dogma and Practice 
in the Law of Associations (1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1007. 
72 On this theory, the usual form exempting officers and directors from 
responsibility might even give trouble, if the section were to be strictly 
construed; except for such exemption, an important asset of the signer 
corporation might consist in an action against officers and directors. See, 
STETSON, op. cit. supra note 21, at 17, for an exposition of the practical 
necessity of such a waiver. 
73106 Cal. App. 144, 288 Pac. 845 (1930). 
74 Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930) (trustees are 
personally liable on trust. contracts, though members of the trust, having 
no control, are not). This case, the first in California on the point, repu- 
diated dicta to the contrary, distinguishing Old River Farms Co. v. Haege- 
lin, 98 Cal. App. 331, 276 Pac. 1047 (1929), and quoted with approval 
Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 330, 4 Sup. Ct. 147 (1884): "When the trustee 
contracts as such, unless he is bound no one is bound as he has no prin- 
cipal. The trust estate cannot promise, the contract is therefore the per- 
sonal undertaking of the trustee." 
75 The court said: "I do not think, however, that a note, negotiable in 
its general form, is rendered non-negotiable because executed by the trustee 
in a way to relieve him from personal liability .... It carries the general 
credit of the trustees as such .... The promise made on behalf of the 
estate, or principal, is as unconditional in its relation to the estate repre- 
sented as that of an individual in relation to himself." Supra note 73, at 
157, 288 Pac. at 850. This is simply to give the estate the status of an 
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to bonds, is better evidence of the need for modification of the 
particular fund provision of the Act than of the clarity of the 
court's reasoning. 
Tax Free Clauses 
Many issues of bonds contain so-called "tax free" clauses, the 
purpose of which is to attract the investor by assuring him full 
realization of the sum promised free of any loss through taxa- 
tion. It may be urged that provisions of this character should 
bring the negotiability of bonds so issued into question on two 
grounds, first as rendering the amount payable uncertain, and 
second as amounting to a promise to do an act in addition to the 
payment of money.76 The few cases on the point,77 however, have 
held, without much discussion, that such clauses do not affect 
negotiability. 
In Chavelle v. Washington Trust Company,78 the clause read 
as follows: 
"All payments upon this bond, both of the principal and interest, shall 
be made without deduction for any tax or taxes that said [maker] may be 
required to pay or to retain therefrom by any present or future laws of 
the United States of America or of the State of Washington, said [maker] 
hereby covenanting to pay any and all such tax or taxes." 
To the argument that the clause made the sum uncertain, the 
court replied that it tended rather to make payment of the 
amount doubly certain. 
With respect to the argument that an undertaking to pay taxes 
is a promise to do something in addition to the payment of money, 
interdicted by the Act, it might be replied narrowly that pay- 
ment of taxes is itself a payment of money, thus not infringing 
the statute. It is gladly confessed that no cases have yet been 
found resorting to such an argument. It is not uncommon, how- 
ever, to make use of clauses somewhat broader than those in- 
volved in these cases, as where the maker undertakes to pay or 
reimburse the holder for any taxes levied against him.79 While 
entity, which is good enough judgment, but difficult to square with the 
ruling in the Oltman case, supra note 73. The same difficulty is presented 
in the case of bonds issued in the name of an estate since it is not regarded 
as a legal entity. 
76 Both matters infringe the requirements of the N. I. L., ?? 2, 5. 
77 Bank of California v. National City Co., supra note 31. With no dis- 
cussion of the clause, bonds, which the opinions indicated contained similar 
provisions, were held negotiable in Weber v. Keith Railway Equipment Co. 
and Higgins v. Hocking Valley Railway, both supra note 31. 
7s 226 Fed. 400 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915). 
79 E. g.: "As provided in the mortgage, the company will reimburse to 
the bearer . .. any personal property tax . . . which may be legally assessed 
upon this bond or upon such bearer . . . by reason of his ownership hereof 
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no cases involving bonds have been found, the current of author- 
ity as to notes containing such clauses is uniformly to the effect 
that they destroy negotiability.80 Whether cases will appear so 
holding as to bonds is, of course, not certain, but since such pro- 
visions infringe no policy of the common law, except possibly the 
notion that a negotiable instrument should be "a courier without 
luggage," a slogan long since without vitality as regards invest- 
ment paper, it would seem that the Act might well be amended 
to make the issue less a matter of conjecture.81 
Redemption, Sinking Fund, Conversion and Acceleration 
Provisions 
Four provisions common in bonds are those having to do with 
redemption before maturity, the maintenance of a sinking fund, 
the conversion privilege and acceleration upon events of default 
of various descriptions. All such provisions have been designed 
to increase the attractiveness of the issue containing them to the 
long term investor. And, although at first sight they seem quite 
foreign to the simplicity of the ordinary negotiable note, it is 
surprising how little difficulty they have occasioned. 
The privilege frequently reserved to the maker of calling in 
and redeeming bonds prior to their maturity date was generally 
held at common law not to affect negotiability; 82 since the adop- 
tion of the Act such provisions have been uniformly held only 
to make the instrument one payable "on or before a fixed or de- 
terminable future time specified therein," as sanctioned by Sec- 
tion 4 (2).83 The discussion has not been as searching, however, 
and paid by him, if application therefor be made." HORR, op. cit. supra 
note 50, at 38. See also ibid. 41. 
80 Bright v. Offield, 81 Wash. 442, 143 Pac. 159 (1914); Coolidge v. Salt- 
marsh, 96 Wash. 541, 165 Pac. 508 (1917); Smith v. Myers, 207 111. 126, 
69 N. E. 858 (1904); Carmody v. Crane, 110 Mich. 508, 68 N. W. 268 
(1896); Mechanics Bank v. Johnson, 104 Conn. 696, 134 Atl. 231 (1926). 
See discussion in Comment (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 267. 
81 Following upon the Mechanics Bank decision, supra note 80, the legis- 
lature in Connecticut amended ? 2 of the N. I. L. to provide that such 
clauses in negotiable paper do not contravene the sum certain requirement. 
This amendment, redrafted, has been tentatively approved by the Commis- 
sioners on Uniform State Laws, HANDBOOK (1931) 222. Also it is proposed 
to amend ? 5 to sanction additional promises so long as they are designed 
to provide security for the principal obligation. Ibid. 224. These two amend- 
ments, valuable in the case of notes, would seem to remove any question 
in the case of bonds. 
2 Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. 181, 20 Sup. Ct. 311 
(1900); American Nat'l Bank v. American Wood Paper Co., 19 R. I. 149, 
32 Atl. 305 (1895); Union Cattle Co. v. International Trust Co., 149 Mass. 
492, 21 N. E. 962 (1889). Contra: Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290 (1879). 
83 See Bank of California v. National City Co., Weber v. Keith Railway 
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as one might wish, since little attention has been given to the 
fact that such issues usually provide for a specific premium to 
be paid on bonds redeemed before maturity. It might be argued 
that this renders the amount uncertain, but, quite properly, this 
has been looked upon as an incidental matter comparable to the 
uncertainty due to the necessity of adjusting the amount of in- 
terest to be paid in such a case; in other words, it is regarded as 
immaterial on the theory that the principal requirement of cer- 
tainty has been complied with by the ultimate promise to pay a 
sum certain at a specified future time. On the other hand, a few 
issues put the clause in the form of a promise, rather than an 
option, to redeem a specified portion of the bonds annually.8" 
While this might be construed to constitute a promise to do an 
act in addition to the payment of money, thus infringing Section 
5 of the Act, it is extremely unlikely that any court will so hold. 
There would seem, therefore, to be little reason for a specific 
amendment to accommodate redemption provisions. 
The same question may be raised in the case of bonds requir- 
ing the maker to establish and maintain a sinking fund either for 
their redemption or their ultimate payment. Such provisions 
obviously not only tend to enhance the value of the promise to 
pay but are directly and intimately related to the principal obli- 
gation. Still the technically minded might argue that they con- 
stitute a promise to do an act in addition to the payment of 
money. The argument is purely academic, for several bonds con- 
taining sinking fund provisions have been held negotiable.85 
Moreover, if Section 5 (5) is to be amended as proposed there 
should be no difficulty whatever, since the proposed amendment 
would broadly sanction any clause designed to afford additional 
security to the principal obligation. 
The negotiability of bonds containing conversion provisions, 
authorizing the holder to require the maker to deliver shares of 
stock in lieu of payment in money, has apparently never been in 
serious doubt. At common law such bonds were universally held 
Equipment Co., Enoch v. Brandon, all supra note 31. See generally, Jones, 
Redeemnable Corporate Securities (1931) 5 So. CAL. L. REV. 83, 96. 
84 So in Union Cattle Co. v. International Trust Co., supra note 82: 
"... a sinking fund of not less than $50,000 nor more than $100,000 in 
each year shall be applied to the purchase or drawing at par of said bonds, 
and ... the whole issue may be drawn at par . . ." Whether such provision 
will be covered by the proposed amendment to ? 5, discussed supra note 81, 
is perhaps questionable since the provision is not merely a security provision, 
but a payment provision. Indeed, a compulsory redemption provision is 
apparently demanded more frequently in an unsecured issue-popularly so- 
called-than in a secured issue. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORA- 
TIONS (1926) 100. 
85 But without discussion of the sinking fund provision. See for example 
Enoch v. Brandon, supra note 31; and Union Cattle Co. v. International 
Trust Co., supra note 82. 
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negotiable.86 The argument was that, as to an instrument meet- 
ing all the other requisites of form, the privilege given the holder 
at his election to surrender it in exchange for stock "did not alter 
its character or make the promise in the alternative." 87 As was 
said in the Hotchkiss case: 88 "The special agreement as to the 
scrip preferred stock in no degree changes the duty of the com- 
pany with respect either to the principal or interest stipulated. 
It confers a privilege upon the holder of the bond, upon its sur- 
render and the surrender of the certificate attached, of obtain- 
ing full preferred stock." The common law holdings were codi- 
fied by Section 5 (4) of the Act, and, though strangely few courts 
have seen fit to cite the section,89 there would seem to be no need 
for amendment. 
There has been some doubt expressed as to the negotiability 
of the conversion privilege itself, but apparently there has been 
no direct holding on the point. It was pointed out in the Hotch- 
kiss case that the negotiability of the bond did not necessarily 
extend to the attached but separable scrip for preferred stock. 
At least so long as it remains attached to the bonds, however, 
such scrip and or the privilege it represents is treated as, and 
should be held, negotiable.90 Dicta supporting the proposition 
may be found in three cases,91 where it was said that the holder 
could enforce his option in his own name, apparently free of 
equities. The two other cases sometimes cited as containing dicta 
to the contrary 92 are perhaps explainable on the ground that the 
holder had failed to comply with conditions precedent to the ex- 
ercise of the option stated on the face of the instrument. Any 
other conclusion would result in the absurdity of making the 
conversion privilege, in the case of a stolen bond, of no use either 
to the bona fide purchaser, who could retain the bond, or to the 
real owner, in whose hands the privilege would apparently be 
left. Until a more substantial issue can be raised, there is quite 
s6 Hodges v. Shuler, 22 N. Y. 114 (1860) (notes convertible on surrender 
before maturity into stock); Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57 N. Y. 573 (1874) 
(government notes convertible at maturity into bonds); Hotchkiss v. Na- 
tional Banks, 21 Wall. 354 (U. S. 1874) (bonds with attached scrip con- 
vertible into stock on presentation of scrip with the bonds) ; Lisman v. 
Milwaukee, L. S. and MW. Ry., 161 Fed. 472 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1908). 
87 Hodges v. Shuler, supra note 86. 
88Suppra note 86, at 355. 
89 The one case found citing the Act accepted the provision without ques- 
tion. Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N. E. 661 (1918). 
90 See, BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928) 131, 
134. 
91 Denney v. Cleveland and P. R. R., 28 Ohio St. 108 (1875); Hodges v. 
Shuler, supra note 86; Loomis v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 102 Fed. 233 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1900). 
92 Lisman v. Milwaukee, L. S. and W. Ry., supra note 86; Gay v. Burgess 
Mills, 30 R. I. 231, 74 AtI. 714 (1909). 
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evidently no need for special legislation to deal with the conver- 
sion privilege. 
In view of the confusion in the authorities as to the effect of 
acceleration provisions in notes,93 some apprehension might be 
felt as to the negotiability of bonds containing such provisions.94 
Apparently, however, no comparable difficulty has developed. 
Just why this should be true is not clear, unless indeed it is for 
the human reason that the "grasping creditor" in the note case 
becomes the "poor investor" seeking his rights against the "large 
corporation" in the bond case. At all events, it is clear that 
bonds capable of acceleration by the trustee upon specified events 
of default were negotiable at common law.95 The same has been 
true without exception under the Negotiable Instruments Law.96 
Moreover, there has been no fastidiousness concerning the events 
of default; they have ranged from non-payment of installments, 
alone specifically sanctioned under the Act,97 to non-payment of 
taxes or depreciation of security. Here again it would seem that 
no legislation is essential; the negotiability of bonds containing 
acceleration provisions is already better established than is the 
negotiability of notes and other money instruments containing 
like provisions.98 
Medium of Payment 
No problem peculiar to bonds is presented by the requirement 
that an instrument to be negotiable must be payable in money,99 
though it may designate "a particular kind of current money in 
which payment is to be made." 100 The ordinary domestic bond, 
93 See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, 13-15, 19-20, 44, 46 and especially 
54-58; Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper (1919) 32 HARV. L. 
REV. 747. 
94 Such provisions are very frequent in bond issues. One of the most 
customary forms follows: "In case an event of default, as defined in the 
said trust mortgage, shall occur, the principal of this bond may become or 
be declared due and payable in the manner and with the effect provided 
in the said trust mortgage." HORR, op. cit. supra note 50, at 35. 
95Chicago & S. S. R. T. Ry. v. Northern Trust Co., 90 Ill. App. 460 
(1900); Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 82; Mason v. Frick, 
105 Pa. 162 (1884); American National Bank v. American Wood Paper 
Co., supra note 82. 
96 Cases cited supra note 83. 
97N. I. L. ? 2(3). 
98 Moreover, the amendments to ?? 4 and 52 now proposed to cover the 
conflict in the case of paper other than bonds containing acceleration provi- 
sions, should serve effectually to dispel any doubts that might arise on the 
point in future as to bonds. HANDBOOK (1931) 223, 228. For a discussion 
of the need for such legislation see, Turner, A Factual Analysis of Certain 
Proposed Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law (1929) 38 YALE 
L. J. 1047, 1058. 
99N. I. L. ?? 1(2), 184. 
100 N. I. L. ? 6(5). 
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corporate or municipal or any other, occasions no difficulty, as it 
is designed to appeal to the eye of the investor by being made 
payable "in GOLD COIN of the United States of America of or 
equal to the present standard of fineness and weight." 101 Even 
if the United States should go off the gold standard, the con- 
tingency contemplated by the gold coin provision,102 there would 
seem no doubt but that bonds so issued would still be payable in 
money within the requirements of the Act, and negotiable. 
A theoretically serious and seemingly unnecessary problem, 
still unsettled, exists as to the negotiability of bonds, as well as 
of other instruments, payable here in foreign money. There ap- 
pears to be little question concerning the negotiability under our 
law of dollar obligations, as well as foreign money obligations, 
payable abroad in the medium of the currency in which they are 
drawn.103 But foreign money obligations payable in this country 
in the medium of the foreign currency have been regarded as 
presenting a different question. In an early case,104 a note made 
and payable in New York in "Canada money" was held to be non- 
negotiable, and, while the case has been severely critized, it has 
not been over-ruled.105 No legislation peculiar to bonds, however, 
seems essential,106 for this problem, although it may be of con- 
siderable importance in the case of bond issues, is equally im- 
portant in connection with all money paper. 
Coupons 
The device employed for more than a century, of tying up in 
small parcels the periodic interest obligations arising upon a 
bond and attaching them as separate coupons, was probably de- 
signed to facilitate interest collections on long term obligations.107 
101 See HORR, op. cit. supra note 50, forms 60-67, 618-620, 622. 
102 How valuable these provisions would be in such contingency is con- 
jectural, in spite of the decisions in Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229 (U. S. 
1869), and Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687 (U. S. 1871), where the 
creditor was given judgment payable in coin, the medium specified, not- 
withstanding the Legal Tender Acts. When the medium specified, gold 
coin, has become no longer obtainable, at least one court has given judg- 
ment payable in legal tender paper money, American Chicle Co. v. Somer- 
ville Paper Box Co. Ltd., 50 Ont. L. R. 517 (1921). 
103 Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 191 (1873); Hebblethwaite v. Flint, 185 
App. Div. 249, 173 N. Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dep't 1918); see Levy v. Cleve- 
land, C. C. and St. L. Ry., 210 App. Div. 422, 206 N. Y. Supp. 261 (1st 
Dep't 1924) (negotiability of such bonds assumed). 104 Thompson v. Sloan, 23 Wend. 71 (N. Y. 1840). 
105 Black v. Ward, supra note 103; Brown v. Perera, 183 App. Div. 892, 
176 N. Y. Supp. 215 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Oliphant, Theory of Money in the 
Law of Commercial Instruments (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 606, 619. 
10o See HANDBOOK (1931) 224, 225 for the amendments now proposed. 
107 "The coupon is simply a mode agreed on between the parties for the 
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The early cases, however, regarded the coupon with some mis- 
givings as a device to circumvent the ethical notion that interest 
should not itself bear interest.108 And it took a long series of 
cases to determine the various Statute of Limitations questions, 
the early disposition being to regard the coupon as so far "par- 
taking of the character" of the parent obligation, that the same 
period should apply to each.109 As to form, the chief concern was 
with the seal, but this was "cryed down" as in the case of bonds, 
before an obvious public need.110 Indeed, there is little question 
on this score today, since seals have become obsolescent 1 and 
coupons easily satisfy the simple formal requirements specified 
for negotiable bearer notes. 
This slow emancipation of the interest coupon as a separate 
instrument capable of being owned and sued upon apart from 
the bond never became quite complete. From the beginning, as 
an apron string attaching it to the mother bond, coupons carried 
some variation of the legend, "being six months interest then 
due upon its first mortgage bonds No. 000." In one sense this 
was merely a recital of the transaction giving rise to the instru- 
ment, and inoffensive.112 It was important, but apparently so 
convenience of the holder in collecting the interest as it becomes due." 
The City of Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477, 484 (1869). 108 In the case of Rose v. The City of Bridgeport, 17 Conn. 243 (1845), 
the court refused recovery of interest on overdue interest warrants, 
though it granted that other courts "under the influence produced by a 
different moral sense regarding the propriety of demanding interest" in, 
such case might hold otherwise. Some fifty odd years later the question 
was looked upon as one of policy, not morals, and the earlier case was 
distinguished. Fox v. Hartford & W. H. Horse R. R., 70 Conn. 1, 38 Atl. 
871 (1897). 
1(9 The City of Kenosha v. Lamson, supra note 107. In subsequent cases 
it was decided, however, that the statute ran from the maturity of the 
coupon, rather than from maturity of the bond. See Clark v. Iowa City, 
20 Wall. 583 (U. S. 1874). Recently it has been held that the coupon is 
so far a distinct instrument that the limitations period applicable to it 
should be determined without regard to the period applying to the bond. 
Dickerson v. Wilkes-Barre & Hazelton R. R., 103 N. J. 175, 143 Atl. 618 
(1926). See discussion (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 823. 
110 Justice Grier in Mercer County v. Hackett, supra note 64, at 95, was 
very positive about the thing: "When a corporation covenants to pay 
to bearer and gives a bond with negotiable qualities, sic, and by this means 
obtains funds for the accomplishment of the useful enterprises of the 
day, it cannot be allowed to evade the payment by parading some obsolete 
judicial decision that a bond, for some technical reason (seal), cannot be 
made payable to bearer." See further Chase National Bank v. Faurot, 149 
N. Y. 532, 44 N. E. 164 (1896). 
111 Indeed, since coupons are themselves not under seal, there would be 
no question but for the close relationship they bear to the bond. The 
point is finally set at rest by the provision that the presence of a seal 
does not affect negotiability. N. I. L. ? 6(4). 
112 "A promise is unconditional though coupled with a statement of the 
transaction which gives rise to the instrument." N. I. L. ? 3(2). 
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merely for the purpose of identifying the coupon and permitting 
it to share later in the security provided by the mortgage. There 
was thus no reason for considering the recital when determining, 
for example, that a bona fide purchaser from a thief might re- 
tain the paper and enforce payment of it as a negotiable instru- 
ment.113 But when the issue concerned the regularity of the 
transaction giving rise to the bond, the relationship became em- 
barrassing. 
In one of the many cases involving this question, McClure v. 
Township of Oxford,114 coupon bonds had been issued in the name 
of the municipality to finance the construction of a toll bridge, 
but, as so often happened in such cases, the election authorizing 
the issue had been improperly conducted. Justice Waite, pointing 
to the bond reference in the coupon, said: "This puts the pur- 
chaser upon inquiry for the bonds, and charges him with notice 
of all they contain." Since it was possible for one familiar with 
the sanctioning legislation as interpreted by the court to see from 
the bond recitals that insufficient notice of election must have 
been given, recovery upon the coupons was denied. This did not 
mean that such coupons were not negotiable, but it did decide 
that the rights of a bona fide purchaser of a coupon could rise no 
higher than those of a purchaser of the relative bond. 
A dozen years later the New York court, in McClelland v. Nor- 
folk Southern R. R.,11" was faced with the same issue, though this 
time it concerned the power of majority bondholders under a 
mortgage to postpone coupon interest payments for a period of 
five years. The court went further than the Supreme Court had 
gone and not only said by way of dictum that purchasers of such 
coupons are on notice of bond and mortgage provisions, but that, 
when rights are reserved in the mortgage to postpone payment 
of interest, the coupons necessarily lose their status as negotiable 
paper-wherefore, had the majority bondholders acted within 
the terms of the mortgage, the plaintiff would have had no re- 
course. The court in the Carterville case 11" took the language 
of these two courts at face value, disregarded the narrow issue, 
113 The point is well settled. Evertson v. National Bank of Newport, 66 
N. Y. 14 (1876): ". . . bonds, as well as the coupons attached thereto, 
have been held negotiable when payable to bearer, for the reason, that they 
are promises to pay money in the form which, by the Law Merchant, 
would make them negotiable as representatives of money, the same as ordi- 
nary commercial instruments." And see Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503 
(1869). 
11494 U. S. 429 (1876). 
15 110 N. Y. 469 (1888). The same result was reached in Augusta Bank 
v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507 (1860), by holding non-negotiable, coupons omit- 
ting words order or bearer. In Johnson v. County of Stark, 24 Ill. 75 
(1860), the fact that payment was to be "on this coupon" was held to 
make it payable to bearer and negotiable. 
11S6Supra note 54. 
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and denied the bona fide purchaser of coupons recovery free of 
defenses between the original parties. 
The problem of how to draw coupons so that they will be 
governed by the corporate mortgage and yet retain their good 
standing as negotiable instruments is thus of a piece with that 
concerning bonds before the court in Enoch v. Brandon."7 If any- 
thing, it is more serious, not only because the reference is more 
distant, from coupons to bonds to mortgage, but because it would 
seem impossible to take the position adopted by the court in 
Enoch v. Brandon and say that a right to postpone payment of 
coupons for any period or to subordinate their payment to new 
indebtedness, merely concerns collateral security rights and does 
not affect the principal obligation of the coupon. This is even 
more obvious in the case of a redemption bond, for surely a 
coupon, which has become a nullity due to redemption before 
maturity of the bond from which it was detached, cannot main- 
tain its face in negotiable company. Certainly its payment must 
be held to be subject to a vital contingency rendering the promise 
conditional.118 At the same time it seems imperative that some 
means, short of the drastic remedy of declaring such paper non- 
negotiable for all purposes, should be adopted to insure recogni- 
tion of the controlling force of mortgage provisions. 
Finally 
The surprising thing disclosed by this survey is that the points 
of friction between long term paper and the law concerning nego- 
tiable instruments generally are apparently so few in number.119 
Even more interesting is the fact that, in most cases, the courts, 
by one means or another, have been able to compose all differ- 
ences amicably. Tax free covenants, redemption and conversion 
clauses, sinking fund provisions and acceleration agreements, 
117 Supra note 31. 
118 N. I. L. ? 3. It is typical to insert in the coupon the clause, "unless 
the bond hereinafter mentioned shall have been previously redeemed." 
HoRR, op. cit. supra note 50, at 51. Moreover, the case is not helped by 
? 4 (2) permitting payment "on or before" maturity, for payment will 
never be made in event the bond is previously called for redemption. 
On the other hand, if such a clause is not inserted in the coupon, and 
it is negotiated separately, it is only by forcibly declaring that the pur- 
chaser must take notice of bond and mortgage that recovery can be denied. 
McClure v. Township of Oxford, supra note 114. There is very little 
authority. In Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Kusterer & Co., supra note 
29, recovery was denied, but in that case the holder had bought bond and 
coupons together. 
119 Only issues having sufficient vitality to get before the courts have 
been examined. There may be others. A study of registered bonds, which 
it is proposed should be made negotiable much as stock certificates have 
been, will be published later. 
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together with the seal, the gold coin provision, to say nothing 
of the engraving, all matters betokening an era of financial well- 
being quite foreign to the frugal simplicity of the times which 
saw the promissory note evolve, have been sanctioned, almost 
hungrily, by the courts. Serious trouble has developed alone with 
regard to the provision that the promise must be unconditional, 
including as it does the idea that payment may not be restricted 
to particular assets. On this last point the courts, in the case of 
the equipment trust certificate and the assessment bond, have 
met complete defeat. Although more successful in the case of 
bonds containing reference provisions importing mortgage con- 
ditions, the esoteric character of some of the decisions recon- 
ciling such provisions with the usual requirements of form testi- 
fies to a desperate plight. 
The logic of the situation is simply that there should be un- 
grudging recognition in the Negotiable Instruments Law of the 
fact that long term investment instruments must be accorded full 
negotiability-notwithstanding they are conditional in character. 
The apparent break from long tradition is only a seeming one 
since the tradition built up to fit paper designed to circulate as 
money has little application to investment paper.120 Moreover, 
although we may disguise the fact as we wish, the courts have 
gone far toward recognizing the situation by their rulings that 
note and mortgage are to be construed separately in determining 
negotiable form, by the device of construing references in bonds 
importing mortgage conditions as relating to the security only 
and, in the case of coupons, by ruling that, though negotiable, the 
holder is on "notice" of the underlying transaction. Of course the 
Hofstadter Act 121 has probably gone too far in sanctioning all 
corporate obligations, whether conditional or not, provided only 
they are issued in a series under an indenture. And "any inter- 
est coupon" is a "corporate bond" within the meaning of that 
statute. At least, it should be possible to require that the bona 
fide purchaser be given some inkling of the nature of the condi- 
tions to which he may be subjected.122 
120 This would simply mean that such paper would be negotiable in all 
respects except for the circumstance that the designated conditions would 
be operative even as against a holder in due course. See, Waterman, The 
Promnisslory Note as a Substitute for Money (1930) 14 MINN. L. REV. 313. 
121 Supra note 10. A considerable amount of legislation of this character 
may be expected. See Cal. Stat., 1921, 471; KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) 
? 3102. 
122 The listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange provide 
among other things that, "the text of bonds should recite conditions of 
issuance, tax exemption, terms of redemption (by sinking fund or other- 
wise), convertibility, default, interchangeability or exchangeability of 
coupon and registered bonds, and conversion into other securities." MEEKER, 
THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE (2d ed. 1930) 564. 
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It is extremely difficult to draw a line in words between bonds 
and notes, but, since there is little need to sanction conditions 
in any paper other than the long term investment type, some line 
must be drawn. In a suggestion made last year to the committee 
engaged in drafting amendments to the Negotiable Instruments 
Law it was proposed that Section 3, defining unconditional 
promise, be amended as to instruments issued in a series.123 The 
term series, probably itself sufficiently well understood without 
further definition, would apply to all the various types of secur- 
ity issues now definitely non-negotiable or in danger of being de- 
clared non-negotiable because subject to conditions or payable 
out of particular assets. The draftsman for the committee, with 
commendable, but, it is believed, excessive, caution, redrafted 
the amendment so that it would apply only to the particular in- 
stances which have thus far caused trouble.124 Since it is thought 
possible, with entire safety, to fix somewhat broader boundaries 
within which new bond provisions may develop,125 the amend- 
ment as first proposed, with some modifications, is again pre- 
sented. 
According to this suggestion, the Section (italicized wording 
being new) would read as follows: 
Section 3. When promise is unconditional.-An unqualified order or 
promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this act, though 
coupled with: 
1. An indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to 
be made, or a particular account to be debited with the amount; 
2. A statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument; or 
3. A statement of, or a reference to a separate writing for a statement 
of, the holders' rights concerning any security for the instrument. 
A promise to pay contained in an instrument issued as one of a series, 
or in any relative instrument representing interest thereon, is unconditional 
within the meaning of this act, although coupled with a statement, or a ref- 
123 See the report of the draftsman, Mr. Llewellyn, HANDBOOK (1931) 
217. 
124 As redrafted the amendment reads: 
"In the following cases the expression of particular conditions or a sum- 
mary thereof with a reference to a separate writing for a full statement 
of such conditions shall not render the instrument non-negotiable: 
(a) Where the instrument is issued and shown on its face to be issued 
as one of a series, and conditions are placed in the interests of the holders 
as a group upon enforcement by individual holders; 
(b) Where the instrument is issued by a government or governmental 
agency and payment is limited to the proceeds of particular described 
taxes, assessments or similar sources of revenue; 
(c) Where the instrument is issued by an unincorporated business 
organization, or by the representatives of an estate, and payment is limited 
to the particular fund constituted by the entire assets of such unincorpo- 
rated business organization or estate. 
Except as provided in this section, an order or promise to pay out of 
a particular fund is not unconditional." HANDBOOK (1931) 222. 
125 Clause (a), supra note 124, would not for example, admit the coupon 
condition "unless sooner redeemed"-unless indeed it could be shown to be 
"in the interest of the holders as a group," which is unlikely. So with other 
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erence to a separate writing for a statement, of any conditions upon the 
holders' rights, or limitations upon the makers' obligations, and the instru- 
ment shall not thereby be rendered non-negotiable, but no such condition or 
limitation upon the makers' promise to pay shall affect the rights of a holder 
in dule course unless notice of the same appears on the face of the instru- 
ment representing the principal obligation.126 
Except as provided in this section, an order or promise to pay out of a 
particular fund is not unconditional. 
One trained in the individualistic tradition of the common law 
has a curious feeling of reluctance in resorting to legislation as 
a solution for a problem such as that concerning investment 
paper-reluctance based not so much on the fear that the amend- 
ment here proposed-or one better worded to accomplish the pur- 
pose-will not once and for all settle the status of such paper, 
but rather for fear that it may. Traditionally, it has been re- 
garded as so much more sporting to hedge a problem about with 
doubts and queries and then to speculate on what the next court 
will do about it that it seems unfair to legislate. Thus has the 
common law advanced-the client paying the costs. But, whether 
sporting or not, it is conceived that advance may equally well 
take place-if that is a consideration-and much more speedily 
and economically, by the process of amendatory legislation. Of 
course, one does not wish continually to be tinkering with a sup- 
posedly uniform statute, but rightly or wrongly we have em- 
barked on a project of codification in commercial matters and 
once in a generation or more is not too often to ask the legislature 
to consolidate the positions being held with difficulty by the more 
conditions. Moreover, it should not be necessary to give notice of all condi- 
tions upon coupons. 
Clause (b) would apply to municipal warrants. According to one author- 
ity, "It would overwhelm municipalities with ruin to hold that such war- 
rants or orders have the qualities of negotiable paper, especially that 
quality which protects an innocent holder for value from defenses of which 
he has no notice, actual or constructive." DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORA- 
TIONS (5th ed. 1911) ? 856. 
Clause (c) merely restates the present problem, what are "the entire 
assets" of an "unincorporated business organization or estate"? 
126 The scheme of this amendment is thus to permit bon4ds and coupons 
to be drawn subject to the terms of a designated indenture-regardless 
of the nature of the conditions found therein-and yet be fully negotiable 
insofar as most incidents of negotiability are concerned. At the same time, 
it is proposed to inlsist that notice of such conditions be given in the bond 
(not the coupon) to the extent that it is sought to make them effective 
as against a holder in due course. After all the plan of denying negotia- 
bility-for all purposes-to conditional investment paper is but a clumsy 
way of regulating the matter. The status of the innocent purchaser from 
a thief is made worse, not better, by such a solution. Indeed, viewed as a 
problem in regulation there is something to be said for passing the whole 
question of conditions over to the various state securities commissions, 
but it is thought that this should be done only as a last resort. 
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advanced courts. And bonds, moreover, have surely by now, after 
a century of knocking about in high financial circles, attained to 
sufficient respectability, as that quality is usually measured, to 
entitle them to at least as much consideration as their poorer 
relations, the other money instruments, have received. 
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